Isaac Scientific Publishing

Journal of Advances in Applied Mathematics

Cooperative Group Behavior Research Based on Lattice

Download PDF (436.8 KB) PP. 139 - 145 Pub. Date: October 1, 2018

DOI: 10.22606/jaam.2018.34004

Author(s)

  • Linlin Shen*
    College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Hebei University, Baoding, China
  • Jingbo Zhou
    College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Hebei University, Baoding, China
  • Longcheng Xing
    College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Hebei University, Baoding, China
  • Xiaodong Pan
    College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Hebei University, Baoding, China
  • Yu Zhang
    China Architecture Standards Design Institute

Abstract

This paper mainly studies the cooperative evolution of game model on the regular lattice, and to explore factors that influence the evolution of cooperation, including proportion of initial betrayers, the game model, the profit ratio, the number of neighbors that profit information, and the policy update rules. The results show that: Different factors have different effects on the evolution of cooperation. The proportion of initial traitors has no effect on the evolution of cooperation (except in extreme cases). The profit ratio has a great influence on the evolution of cooperation. The different profit ratio has a direct impact on the stability of cooperation evolution, and the stable state of the profit ratio between 1.8 and 2.0 is almost the same. Policy update rules are the most important factors affecting the evolution of cooperation, and different rules determine the ratio of cooperation when the evolution of cooperation is stable. With the increase in the number of neighbors that profit information, the ratio of cooperation is steadily rising when cooperation is stable. Prisoner's dilemma is more cooperative than snowdrift game.

Keywords

Rules lattice; influence factor; game; evolution of cooperation

References

[1] Liu Mingyong, Lei Xiaokang, Yang Panpan et al. Theoretical Modeling and Empirical Analysis of Cluster Movement [J].Science Bulletin, 2014 (25): 2464-2483

[2] Jiang Tengxu. Overview of intelligent optimization algorithms [J]. computer knowledge and technology: academic exchanges, 2007, 2 (8): 221~222+244

[3] Marshall A. Principle of Economics[J]. Germany, the UK and the USA”, in67.Fall:519~524

[4] Smith J M. The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts[C]. David K. Levine,2010

[5] Smith J M, Price G R. The logic of animal conflict[J]. Resonance, 2010, 10(11):5~5

[6] Weibull J W. Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Games & Economic Behavior, 1995

[7] Bester H, Güth W. Is Altruism Evolutionary Stable?[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1994, 34(2):193~209

[8] Guttman J M. On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 16(1):31~50

[9] Daniel G, Arce M, Todd S. The Dilemma of the Prisoners' Dilemmas[J]. Kyklos, 2005, 58(1):3~24

[10] Pan Feng, Xibao, Wang Lin.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation Strategies among Local Governments[J].China Population, Resources and Environment, 2014, 24 (06): 97-102.

[11] Liu Xuwang, Wang Dingwei.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Expert Behavior in Group Bid Evaluation[J].Journal of Management Science, 2015,18(01): 50-61.

[12] Cao Xia, Zhang Lupeng.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Technology Innovation Diffusion[J].China Population, Resources and Environment, 2015,25(07): 68-76.

[13] Wu Zhixi, Rong Zhihai, Wang Wenxu. Game mechanics on complex networks [J]. mechanics progress, 2008, 38 (6): 794~804

[14] Watts D J. The “New” Science of Networks[J]. Physics Today, 2003, 6(5):243~270

[15] Axelrod R, Hamilton W D. Evolution of Cooperation[M]// The evolution of inequality :. Stanford University Press, 1981:135-60.

[16] Nowak M A, May R M. Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos.[J]. Nature, 1992, 359(6398):826~829

[17] Hamlin A, Sugden R. The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare[J]. 1986, 97